In a reasonably calibrated Mortensen and Pissarides matching model, shocks to average labor productivity can account for only a small portion of the ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies (Shimer (2005a) ). In this paper, I argue that if vintage speci…c shocks rather than aggregate productivity shocks are the driving force of ‡uctuations, the model does a better job of accounting for the data. I add heterogeneity in jobs (matches) with respect to the time the job is created in the form of di¤erent embodied technology levels. I also introduce speci…c capital that, once adapted for a match, has less value in another match. In the quantitative analysis, I show that shocks to di¤erent vintages of entrants are able to account for ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies and that, in this environment, speci…c capital is important to decreasing the volatility of the destruction rate of existing matches. JEL Classi…cation: E24, E32, J41, J63, J64
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vacancies. In most papers, aggregate labor productivity shocks have been used as the source of ‡uctuations in these variables, which has resulted in two major problems. One problem, as argued by Shimer (2005) , is that when the model is reasonably calibrated, shocks to aggregate productivity can account for only a small portion of the volatilities in unemployment and vacancies.
The second problem is that an MP model with only aggregate productivity shocks generates a very high correlation between vacancies per unemployed worker and average labor productivity, while in the data the correlation is much smaller (close to zero for the period 1986-2005).
In this paper, I show that the addition of speci…c capital, which has less value in another match once it is already employed in a match, and shocks to the embodied technology of matches that a¤ect only entrants in any given period successfully resolve both problems. In the model, a production unit (a match) is composed of a …rm, a worker, and the capital employed in the match. Every match embodies a technology level determined at the time of its creation. This is a plausible representation if investment opportunities available at the time of creation of any match a¤ect the technology of the match permanently. In this setting, part of economic growth is driven by the replacement of old, low-productivity jobs with new high-productivity ones. 1 The embodied technology framework is consistent with the micro-level evidence that …rm level productivity is highly persistent and that around half of aggregate productivity growth happens through reallocation of workers across …rms. 2 More important, shocks to new vintages are now a signi…cant source of ‡uctuations.
The inclusion of shocks to the embodied technology of entrants solves the problem related to volatilities because these shocks have a large impact on vacancy postings (and thus on the unemployment rate) and a small impact on average labor productivity, both of which are consistent with the data. A shock to the embodied technology of new entrants a¤ects the productivity of new entrants permanently, while the e¤ects of an aggregate shock (calibrated to aggregate productivity data) is persistent but not permanent. This implies that shocks to embodied technology have a bigger impact on pro…ts for entrants and so on vacancy postings. In addition, because these shocks a¤ect only new entrants and leave the productivity of existing matches unchanged, their e¤ect on average labor productivity is negligible.
The second important element in the model, speci…c capital, improves the performance of the model because it controls the rate of destruction of existing matches. This feature is important to matching the strong negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment, also known as the 1 This structure does not exclude the possibility of growth in the productivity of existing matches. It is reasonable to think that some technological upgrades might necessitate a new match, while some others can be adopted within an existing match. In the quantitative analysis I will assume that only a portion of the growth in the macroeconomy happens through the replacement process. 2 Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) show that there is a large degree of persistence in productivity ranking and that a signi…cant part of the economy's productivity growth accrues by means of resource reallocation. Foster et al.
(2001) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) provide an extensive review of the existing literature on the topic.
Beveridge curve. The model with only aggregate shocks gets this correlation right. 3 In the existing literature, there is concern that a model with sector-speci…c shocks that a¤ect only a portion of the economy (such as shocks to only the new vintage, as in this paper) would be unable to match this relationship. 4 A positive shock to the new vintage results in an increase in the pro…ts of entrants and in vacancy postings. At the same time, existing low-productivity matches might be terminated, so that workers look for employment within the new vintage; and at the macro level vacancies and unemployment might increase together (weakening the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies). In this model, this problem does not arise and the strong negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment is preserved because the speci…c capital of the match makes existing matches more valuable relative to new ones. In the face of a positive shock to new matches, mass destruction of existing matches does not occur as that would result in a loss of valuable match-speci…c capital.
To examine whether the model can account for the data quantitatively, I determine the shock processes by minimizing the distance between the business cycle frequency moments in the data and the moments generated by the model. In the estimations, I …nd that the volatility of vintagespeci…c shocks is close to the volatility of aggregate shocks. The combination of aggregate and vintage-speci…c shocks can account for the volatilities in unemployment, vacancies, and average labor productivity. I also …nd low correlation between aggregate shocks and vintage-speci…c shocks, which suggests the importance of distinguishing between shocks that a¤ect only the new investments and shocks that a¤ect the overall economy. In addition, I show that speci…c capital is important to keep the correlation between vacancies and unemployment strongly negative as in the data.
Most of the papers that responded to Shimer's (2005a) criticism of the benchmark model continue to rely on aggregate productivity shocks. Farmer (2004) , Shimer (2004) , and Hall (2005) propose rigid wages as a solution to the volatility puzzle. In the standard model where wages are determined through Nash bargaining, wages comove strongly with the productivity shock, preventing a strong response in pro…ts. Rigid wages set close to output allow pro…ts to respond more strongly to aggregate productivity shocks. Although the assumption of rigid wages is consistent with low cyclicality of aggregate wages in the data, Pissarides (2007) and Haefke et. al. (2007) show for the US economy that wages in new jobs respond strongly to market conditions; and in the model the strong response of pro…ts (and vacancies) requires low cyclicality of wages in the newly created jobs. 5 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) calibrate the model to match the elasticity 3 A positive aggregate shock to the economy increases the pro…ts of …rms and the vacancy postings. Increased vacancy postings result in higher job-…nding rates, decreasing unemployment. As a result, vacancies and unemployment move in opposite directions in response to aggregate productivity shocks. 4 See Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989) . 5 Rigidity of wages in continuing matches has no impact on pro…ts and vacancies if wages in continuing matches are set at a …xed level determined through Nash bargaining at the …rst period of the match. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the model environment for the stationary economy and derive the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 does the same for the growth economy. Section 4 presents the calibration and estimation of the parameters and displays the results. Section 5 concludes.
Stationary Economy

Model
The model is a stochastic discrete time version of the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model (Pissarides (1985), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) ). I add embodied technology shocks and speci…c capital. First, the stationary version of the model is introduced because of its simplicity. In the following section, growth in vintages is incorporated into the model. a slightly di¤erent setting where workers are risk averse and …rms are risk-neutral, and the optimal contract results in wages that are less responsive to productivity shocks in the continuing matches. Both settings imply less cyclical wages at the aggregate level, while the response of wages in new matches is strongly procyclical.
Workers, Firms, and Capital
There is a measure one of in…nitely lived workers maximizing their lifetime utility. Workers are risk-neutral and have a discount rate of :
At any point in time, a worker is either working or is unemployed and looking for a job.
Employed workers cannot search for jobs. When the worker is unemployed, he receives an income equivalent utility ‡ow of b > 0.
Firms are also risk-neutral with the same discount factor as workers and there is an in…nite supply of them.
A production unit is composed of a …rm, a worker, and K units of capital. The rental rate of capital is assumed to be …xed and is equal to r in each period.
The production of a match depends on both the period aggregate shock A t that a¤ects all matches in the same way and the embodied technology of the match z, which is …xed for the lifetime of the match. The time t output of a match with speci…c productivity z is equal to:
To produce positive output, K units of capital need to be employed inelastically in the match.
The distribution of speci…c shocks for new entrants depends on the investment opportunities available at the time of the entry, which are summarized by the state variable Z t . In each period, match-speci…c shocks for new entrants are drawn according to some probability distribution function H (zjZ t ) : The couplet of shocks (A t ; Z t ) follows a …rst order Markov process according to a bivariate probability distribution G (A t+1 ; Z t+1 jA t ; Z t ) : This speci…cation allows the two shocks to be correlated with each other.
To model speci…c capital, I assume that once capital is employed in a match, it becomes partially match speci…c. When the match is dissolved and the match capital is employed for another job, a proportion 2 (0; 1) of its value depreciates.
I assume that capital is rented from a risk-neutral intermediary at the rental rate r = 1= 1:
If the match ends, the intermediary is compensated for the loss of value in capital by the worker and the …rm. The worker pays a proportion 2 (0; 1) of the loss in value and the …rm pays for the remaining portion (1 ):
Given the above contract, the ‡ow cost of capital to the match is equal to:
where K is the capital that is inelastically needed for production. How the ‡ow cost of capital is shared between the worker and the …rm does not a¤ect the results, so I assume without loss of generality that C K is paid by the …rm.
When the match ends, the compensation to the intermediary is equal to C E :
C E is the discounted value of the loss in capital. If the match ends, the worker pays C E and the …rm pays (1 )C E to the intermediary.
The Labor Market
There are frictions in the labor market such that …rms and workers do not meet immediately. A …rm needs to post a vacancy at a …xed cost C V per period to meet with a worker. In addition, posting a vacancy does not ensure a meeting. The total number of meetings in each period follows the function m(u t ; v t ); where u t denotes the unemployment rate and v t denotes the number of vacancies posted in that period. The function m(u t ; v t ) is assumed to be concave in each argument and constant returns to scale in both arguments. t = v t =u t denotes the market tightness at time t. Because the meeting function is constant returns to scale, the probability of a …rm meeting a worker after posting a vacancy and the probability of an unemployed worker meeting a …rm both depend only on market tightness t and not on vacancies or unemployment separately.
The probability of an unemployed worker meeting a …rm is:
The probability that a …rm that has posted a vacancy meets an unemployed worker is:
Since there are match-speci…c shocks, every meeting does not necessarily turn into employment.
For a meeting to turn into employment, both the …rm and the worker need to agree about it. Let t denote the set of match-speci…c productivity draws z for which a meeting turns into employment.
Speci…c shocks may also lead to the endogenous termination of matches. The set t denotes those speci…c shocks z for which both the …rm and the worker prefer to continue with employment.
In addition to endogenous termination of employment, workers and …rms separate exogenously with probability each period. In the period in which the match is formed, the probability of exogenous termination is zero.
Determination of Wages
Wages are determined according to a Nash bargaining game between the worker and the …rm over the total surplus of the match and are renegotiated each period. The bargaining power of the worker is 2 [0; 1] and that of the …rm is 1
Another assumption used is that the termination cost C E is shared in the same proportion to the bargaining weight of each party, that is, = . A motivation for the assumption is that whoever is getting more of the surplus will have more incentive to undertake the cost of termination as the surplus of the match becomes negative. 7 The formulation that wages are renegotiated in each period of an existing match might seem unrealistic given that in the quantitative analysis the time period is taken to be a week. As referred to in Shimer (2005a) , because agents are risk-neutral, the analysis does not necessarily pin down the timing of wage payments. The surplus is not a¤ected by the frequency of wage-negotiation and the analysis below holds as long as the worker gets the value determined by Nash bargaining at the start of the match. Wages can be paid in any manner following employment as long as a commitment technology on promises exist.
Characterization of Recursive Equilibrium
I look for an equilibrium where the market tightness depends only on aggregate state variables
The following section expresses the equilibrium equations for the wage contract that depend on embodied productivity z of the match and aggregate state variables (A; Z) : Section 2.2.1 speci…es wages under Nash bargaining. Section 2.2.2 simpli…es the equilibrium equations using the Nash bargaining wages speci…ed in Section 2.2.1.
The value of the match to the …rm is:
where 1 [:] is the indicator function, which takes a value of 1 if the statement inside is true; otherwise, it takes a value of zero. All expectations in the paper are conditioned on current values of (A; Z).
w(A; Z; z) is the ‡ow wage rate. Period pro…t is output less the wage and the ‡ow cost of capital.
In the next period, the decision to terminate or continue with the match happens after all agents observe the aggregate productivity shocks
termination (which happens with probability ) the match ends and the cost to the …rm is (1 )C E ; otherwise the match continues. Match speci…c productivity z stays the same next period, so the expectation of pro…ts is taken only over the possible aggregate states of next period. 6 In the period that the …rm and the worker meet, if they decide to turn the match into employment, it is assumed that the wage negotiation happens after capital is employed. As a result, wages are determined in the same manner in each period regardless of whether it is the …rst or a subsequent period. 7 There is an equilibrium even without this assumption. The condition just ensures that employment is undertaken and terminated whenever it is e¢ cient to do so.
Let
(A; Z) denote the set of match-speci…c productivities for which the …rm is willing to continue with employment and let (A; Z) be the set of match-speci…c productivities for which it is willing to turn a meeting into employment. The sets are determined by:
Once capital has been adopted for a match, the cost of terminating the match for the …rm is
(1 )C E . The …rm is willing to continue with employment unless its value drops below (1 )C E :
If capital is not yet employed, the outside value to the …rm of rejecting the match is 0.
The value of the match to the worker is:
where U (A; Z) is the value of unemployment in aggregate state (A; Z). The ‡ow value to the worker is the period wage rate. In the following period, if the match is not subject to an exogenous termination shock and z 2 (A 0 ; Z 0 ) the worker receives next period's value of employment in the same match. Otherwise, he receives his outside option, which is unemployment utility minus the cost of termination of the match C E .
The value of unemployment is:
When the worker is unemployed he gets the ‡ow utility of b. With probability f ( (A; Z)) he gets a meeting with an employer next period, which turns into employment if z 0 2 (A 0 ; Z 0 ); otherwise, he gets unemployment utility in the next period as well. If a match does occur, the worker gets the employment value of the match W (A 0 ; Z 0 ; z 0 ).
Similar to the …rm's case, w (A; Z) denotes the set of match-speci…c productivities for which the worker is willing to continue with employment, and w (A; Z) denotes the set of match-speci…c productivities for which he is willing to turn a meeting into employment:
The logic is similar to the one applied to the …rm. In an already existing match, the worker's outside opportunity is the unemployment value minus the cost of terminating the match to the worker, C E : For a new meeting to be accepted, the expected value within the match needs to be higher than his outside value of unemployment.
The sets (A; Z) and (A; Z) can be found by:
The above condition is a result of the assumption that for employment to continue or for a meeting to turn into employment, it should be acceptable to both parties.
As there is free entry to posting vacancies, the expected value to posting a vacancy is equal to zero, which gives the condition:
The …rm pays the cost of posting a vacancy in the current period and meets with a worker next period with probability q ( (A; Z)), which turns into a match only if z 0 2 (A 0 ; Z 0 ).
Let (z) denote the mass of matches with productivity shock z. 0 (z) and u 0 denote, respectively, the mass of people with productivity shock z and the mass of unemployed people in the following period. The law of motion for the unemployment rate u is:
The right-hand side of the above equation can be understood as the result of three types of ‡ows.
Of the workers unemployed, uf ( (A; Z)) of them gets a meeting with a …rm, and if the draw of the meeting z 0 is an element of (A 0 ; Z 0 ) the worker exits the unemployment pool. A fraction of employed workers'employment ends exogenously. The …nal term is the addition to the unemployment pool of the workers whose employment is endogenously terminated.
The law of motion for (z) is: The average labor productivity of the economy is:
The mass of …rms (z) is multiplied by their speci…c productivity and the weighted sum is divided by the total mass of …rms.
In the next section I specify the wage rate determination in Nash bargaining to solve for the equilibrium.
Determination of wages (Nash Bargaining)
The surplus of an activated match is:
The term C E comes from the fact that the match-speci…c part of capital has a value only as long as the match continues. According to Nash bargaining, the wages and pro…ts are determined as:
The …rm gets a share (1 ) of the surplus above its outside value of (1 ) C E . The worker gets a proportion of the surplus above its outside value of U (A; Z) C E :
Equilibrium Conditions Rewritten with a Nash Bargaining Assumption
In this section, equilibrium conditions are simpli…ed using the surplus allocation rules speci…ed in the previous section. The main aim is to obtain a simpli…ed version of the surplus equation.
Using the wage setting rule of Nash bargaining, equation (4) , and the assumption that = ;
it is seen that the …rm is willing to continue employment whenever the surplus of the match is positive S 0: Likewise, the worker is willing to continue employment under the same condition, S 0; which is found by using equation (8) . As a result, the set (A; Z) is:
To specify the set (A; Z), it is notationally more convenient to de…ne the surplus of a meeting in the …rst period before capital is activated. I denote this as S B :
The di¤erence between S B and S is that, as capital is not yet activated, C E is not part of the surplus. Using the wage setting rule of Nash bargaining, equation (5) and the assumption that = , it is found that the …rm is willing to turn the meeting into employment whenever the surplus of the meeting (before capital is employed) is positive S B 0: Likewise, using equation (9) the worker is also willing to turn the meeting into employment whenever S B 0: Following these, the set (A; Z) is:
Because = , using equations (12) and (15), I get = S B . Substituting this and equation (18) into equation (10), the free-entry condition becomes:
The derivation of the surplus expression below is given in Appendix 1.
The surplus equation is quite intuitive. The …rst term is the period output of the …rm. The ‡ow cost of capital is subtracted, but the cost of capital is (1 )C K rather than C K , as the value of capital is only (1 )K in other matches. The next two terms are related to the unemployment utility of the worker that is subtracted from the surplus. The next period's surplus is added only for the states in which it is above zero.
The equilibrium for (A; Z) can be solved numerically by using equations (17) and (18) . The solution algorithm is given in Appendix 3. In the model, market tightness (and thus vacancies) adjust immediately. Once (A; Z) and sets (A; Z) and (A; Z) are solved for, the mass of people of di¤erent productivities and unemployment can be simulated using their laws of motion.
3 Growth economy
Augmented Model
In this section, I add growth to the model economy presented in the preceding section. The growth in the economy can be driven by either growth in aggregate productivity A or growth in new vintages. The growth in A, since it does not a¤ect the relative productivity between matches, does not change the endogenous mechanisms. In the following section, growth in the productivity of vintages is considered.
The productivity parameters A; Z and z are stationary in this section also, but there is a trend growth of 1 + g in the embodied productivity of new meetings. The time t output of a match created at time t; with speci…c productivity z is equal to:
For a balanced growth path, I require that the minimum capital needed for positive production grows at the same rate as the trend productivity growth for new cohorts (1 + g), and once the match is formed, the required capital is …xed for that cohort. With this assumption, the ‡ow cost of capital of a match formed at time t becomes:
As in the stationary economy, proportion of employed capital becomes match speci…c. The cost of exit for a match that is created at time t is:
For a balanced growth path, it is possible to keep the cost of posting a vacancy C V constant, and let (A; Z) grow at a constant rate; or keep (A; Z) stationary, and let the cost of posting a vacancy grow at rate 1 + g. The two assumptions will result in the same dynamics in other variables. I use the second approach and assume:
For a balanced growth path, the ‡ow utility of unemployment needs to grow at rate (1 + g) as well:
The rest of the assumptions are the same as in the stationary economy.
Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, only stationary versions of the equilibrium equations are presented. Non-stationary equilibrium equations for the growth economy are given in Appendix 2. To make the model stationary, the surplus equation is detrended by (1 + g) t . A variable x is denoted as b x in the detrended economy.
I again look for an equilibrium where the market tightness depend on the aggregate state variables (A; Z).
In the stationary economy, the surplus b S and set b , in addition to aggregate and match speci…c shocks (A; Z; z), depends on the age of the match, which is the di¤erence between the current period and the period in which the match is formed d = t ; t.
The surplus of a match is:
The surplus in the growth economy is very similar to the surplus found in the no-growth economy.
The only di¤erence is that the output minus the ‡ow cost of capital that is attached to the vintage (zA (1 ) C K ) is shrinking relative to the terms related to the unemployment utility of the
(1 ) (A; Z) . This comes from the fact that the output zA and the ‡ow cost of capital C K of an existing match are shrinking at rate (1 + g) relative to the productivity of the newest vintage, as the match ages. As the unemployment utility of the worker is increasing relative to staying in the match as the match gets older, the surplus must become negative as the match ages.
Again it is of use to de…ne the surplus of a meeting in the …rst period before capital is employed, The no pro…t condition is:
The ‡ow of motion for the mass of matches with productivity z belonging to cohort d, (z; d), As cohorts age, in the limit their mass approaches zero as they are exogenously terminated at rate each period.
The ‡ow of motion for unemployment u is:
As in the stationary economy, the change in the number of unemployed is composed of new employments that exit the unemployment pool, plus the exogenously and endogenously terminated matches.
Finally, the detrended average labor productivity in the economy is:
For the numerator, the mass of …rms (z; d) is multiplied by their productivity level z and as the productivity is expressed relative to the productivity of the newest cohort, it is discounted according to its age
The weighted sum is divided by the total mass of …rms to get the average productivity.
Quantitative Exercise
The summary statistics of unemployment, vacancy postings, labor productivity, and market tightness for the US economy are displayed in Table 1. The table is The correlation of unemployment and vacancies is -0.919. This strong negative correlation is also known as the Beveridge curve in the literature. The correlation between labor productivity and market tightness is 0.393. As we will see, with only shocks to average labor productivity, the model generates almost full correlation between these variables. Although this is partially due to the fact that there is no propagation mechanism in the model, it also suggests that there might be other sources of ‡uctuations in market tightness and unemployment.
The model is solved numerically to evaluate its quantitative implications. Below describes the speci…cation of functional forms, choice of parameter values, and evaluation of results.
Speci…cation of Functional Forms
For the matching function I use the functional form introduced by Den Haan et al. (2000):
This function ensures that the probability of …nding a job and of …lling a vacancy always lies between 0 and 1.
Productivity shocks (A t ; Z t ) follow a …rst order Markov process of the form below.
Innovations (" A;t ; " Z;t ) are serially independent, multivariate normal random variables distributed as below:
For simplicity, I assume that all new matches formed at time t have productivity Z t .
Choice of Parameter Values
Standard parameters are calibrated in line with the preceding literature. The parameters governing the shock processes are chosen by minimizing the distance between the moments in the data and the moments of the simulations of the model. For comparative purposes, I perform the same exercises for an economy with only aggregate shocks. In the economy with only aggregate shocks match-speci…c productivities are normalized to one. The …rst part describes the calibration of the parameters, which are displayed in Tables 2-3 .
The time period in the model is a week. Weekly discount factor is chosen as 0:99 1=12 which corresponds to a 4% yearly risk-free interest rate. estimates a job …lling rate q of 0.71, which gives an average value of = f =q = 0:634. At weekly frequencies these estimates imply a job …nding rate of 0:139 and a job separation rate of 0:0081.
The exogenous separation rate is chosen such that the average weekly separation rate in the model (which includes both the endogenous and exogenous separations) is 0:0081. The ‡ow cost of posting a vacancy, C V ; and the matching parameter l are calibrated to …t the average market tightness = 0:634 and the average job …nding rate f = 0:139.
The bargaining weight of the worker is determined by the Hosios e¢ ciency condition. With a
Cobb-Douglas matching function, the Hosios condition of equating bargaining power to the unemployment elasticity can be satis…ed everywhere. This is possible for HRW's matching function only on average because the elasticity is not constant. I set equal to the steady state unemployment elasticity of the matching function, 1=(1 + l ).
The ‡ow utility of unemployment b is chosen to be 0.45 which is 70 % of net labor income. 8 This value of ‡ow unemployment utility is above Shimer's (2005a) 40% (of labor income)and below
Hagedorn and Manovskii's (2007) 95.5% (of labor income).
The total capital cost consists of the ‡ow cost of capital C K and the loss of value in capital when it is employed in another match C E . The ‡ow cost of capital C K is calibrated to match a capital share of 35%. The calibrated C K is 0:27 and 0:22 for the no-growth and growth economies respectively. The di¤erence arises from the fact that the cost of exit C E used is higher in the growth economy and to keep total capital cost …xed at 35% C K is decreased to 0.22 in the growth economy.
Increasing C E without a corresponding decrease in C K increases the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies on its own. 9 In that respect, quantifying C E as part of the physical capital cost works against me when trying to explain the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies.
For the growth economy, I assume that embodied technology grows at rate of 1% per year, which would imply that the rest of the growth in labor productivity comes from growth in aggregate productivity A.
For the parameters of the output process A ; Z ; A;Z ; A ; Z and the cost of terminating a match C E ; I minimize the distance between the business cycle moments of the data and modelgenerated simulations. The key business cycle moments matched are as in Table 1 . 8 Net labor income refers to wage income minus the portion of the cost of exit paid by the worker (a portion of cost of exit CE is paid by the worker). 9 Increasing CE (without a corresponding decrease in CK ) increases the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies.
The mechanism works in the same way as increasing the ‡ow cost of capital CK or increasing the ‡ow utility of unemployment b. Lowering the portion of output that is shared between the worker and the …rm (which is equal to output minus the ‡ow unemployment utility of the worker and all other costs that are paid to third parties for production) increases the volatility of market tightness. In that respect, increasing CE, CK , and b has similar impacts on increasing the volatility of market tightness.
and starting with an arbitrary mass of …rms, the model is simulated, quarterly series are calculated using averages of weekly series and the quarterly series are HP …ltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600 in an identical manner to the empirical data. The vector of simulation moments s ( ) (which includes the same business cycle moments as in d ) is an average over 50 simulations each 500 quarters in length. The estimate of minimizes the weighted distance between the actual and simulated moments. Formally I solve the below problem using a search routine:
where W is a positive de…nite weighting matrix.
For the weighing matrix, I chose to perfectly match the volatility and autocorrelation of average labor productivity. This follows the spirit of previous exercises in the literature, which is to show whether it is possible to match the volatilities of market tightness and unemployment within the standard search and matching model given the low volatility of average labor productivity in the data. The search and matching model creates a low autocorrelation of vacancies relative to the data which might also a¤ect correlations to some degree. To minimize that problem, I put a higher weight on volatility statistics than autocorrelation and correlation statistics. In all experiments, the weighting matrix used is identical.
Results
Standard Model
For comparison purposes, I …rst present the results of an economy with only aggregate (disembodied) shocks. The results are displayed in Tables 4-5 . The volatility and autocorrelation of the shocks are pinned down only by autocorrelation and volatility of average labor productivity (because a very high weight is put on these moments). In the simulation results, volatilities of vacancies and unemployment are around one-fourth of the data. These volatilities are higher than the ones found by Shimer (2005a) , because there is capital in my model, and the ‡ow unemployment utility chosen (as a share of labor income) is higher. Both of these factors increase the response of pro…ts/vacancies to productivity shocks.
The model generates nearly full correlation of 0.988 between the market tightness and average labor productivity, while in the data, the correlation is much lower at 0.393. As I mentioned in the previous section, a third problem is that the autocorrelation of vacancies is lower in the model than the data, and this problem will persist in the augmented setting also.
Model With Embodied Technology Shocks
Role of Embodied Technology Shocks:
The results of the stationary model with both embodied and disembodied technology shocks are presented in Tables 6-7 . The estimated conditional and unconditional volatility of embodied shocks are a bit higher than that of disembodied shocks. The correlation between the two shocks is low at 0.11. The volatilities from the model with embodied technology shocks …t the data much better than does the exercise with only aggregate shocks. Volatilities of vacancies, unemployment and market tightness have increased to the level of the data. In addition, because the correlation between embodied and disembodied shocks is low, the correlation of market tightness with labor productivity approaches that observed in the data.
In Table 8 , I feed in the estimated parameters for embodied and disembodied shocks separately to decompose the e¤ect of the shocks. The second row feeds in only the embodied technology shocks (normalizing disembodied productivity to one), and the third row feeds in only the disembodied shocks (normalizing embodied productivity to one for all matches). Embodied technology shocks on their own have very little impact on average labor productivity, while they explain almost all of the ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The pro…ts and market tightness are much more sensitive to embodied technology shocks because when embodied technology shock is higher than the trend, given that there is mean reversion in the shocks, the …rm has a strong incentive to post a vacancy and embody that technology in the new job. 10 Embodied technology shocks have little impact on average labor productivity because they a¤ect only the new cohort of matches, and new employment constitutes only a small portion of total employment. The fact that a big portion of employed workers do not change productivity from one period to the next also implies that the autocorrelation of average labor productivity is high. The third row shows that disembodied technology shocks explain a much bigger portion of the volatility of average labor productivity but explain only a quarter of the movements in unemployment and vacancies.
Role of speci…c capital, C E :
With the inclusion of embodied technology shocks, the correlation between unemployment and vacancies increases slightly relative to the model with only disembodied shocks, but there is still a strong negative correlation. The correlation stays strong due to the cost of exit C E , which is set at 7 weeks of output. In Table 9 , I give the results of an exercise where I decrease the cost of exit C E to 3.5 (in the exercise C K is adjusted to keep the total cost of capital at 35%). In this case, the volatility of vacancies is higher and the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is weaker at -0.240. The two paragraphs below explain the mechanism for these e¤ects.
Decreasing C E increases the correlation between unemployment and vacancies. The mechanism is best explained using a positive embodied technology shock for the new entrants. When there is a positive shock to the new entrants, the outside value of employed workers increases since they have the option to terminate the current match to be employed in the productive new vintage. In addition, with a positive shock more vacancies are posted per unemployed worker making the duration of unemployment shorter, further increasing the outside value of employed workers. As the outside value of employed workers increases, more workers will terminate their current match to go into the unemployment pool to be reemployed in the new vintage. If the cost of terminating the match is low, then a positive shock results in an increase in unemployment (due to the termination of low of productivity jobs), and also an increase in vacancies per unemployed worker, since productivity is higher. This leads to a higher correlation of unemployment and vacancies relative to the case of high termination cost. In that respect, C E is important to preserve the strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies observed in the data.
In addition, when C E decreases, the volatility of vacancies increases. In response to a positive embodied technology shock market tightness increases (as expected pro…ts increase), and at the same time, with a lower cost of exit, unemployment increases because of endogenous separations.
Since vacancies are equal to the multiplication of market tightness with unemployment, the response of vacancies will be stronger when there are more endogenous separations making vacancies more volatile.
One clari…cation is that increasing C E a¤ects the results only when there are endogenous termination of matches, that is, increasing C E decreases the endogenous termination of matches, which impacts other moments also. Once endogenous terminations approach zero, increasing the termination cost is neutral for the results. This is because I decrease C K proportionately when I increase C E , so that the total cost of capital is the same in all exercises. Otherwise, as mentioned in the calibration section, the increasing cost of C E leaves less surplus to be shared between the …rm and worker, and that increases the volatility of market tightness on its own. So neutralizing the e¤ect of C E by a proportionate change in C K works against me when trying to explain the volatilities observed in market tightness and unemployment. Given the neutrality of C E above a threshold, the choice of C E does not strictly come from a minimization problem of ( ) (Eq (21)). It is chosen high enough such that there is almost no endogenous termination of matches and increasing it further does not a¤ect the simulation results.
It is also useful to compare the C E used in the simulations with the estimates of speci…c human 
Model With Growth
The growth economy results are displayed in Tables 10-11 . The results are very similar to the case of the stationary economy. The biggest di¤erence concerns the cost of exit C E : The cost of exit found has now increased to 11 weeks of output. In the growth economy, a higher cost of exit is needed to decrease endogenous separations to almost zero. With growth, there are two di¤erent forces at work that might cause matches to be endogenously terminated. One is that, as in the stationary economy, a vintage of entrants might have low detrended productivity shocks.
The second is that as the vintage ages, productivity of the vintage relative to that of new entrants decreases. Whatever the cost of exit is, old cohorts choose at some point to end the employment and it is impossible to fully prevent endogenous terminations. What is important is that as vintages age, their proportion in the population approaches zero because of exogenous terminations. If the endogenous termination is late enough in their lifecycle, its e¤ect on unemployment becomes negligible. In this setting, a higher cost of exit is needed to decrease the endogenous termination of matches to negligible levels.
Conclusion
In this paper, I give a competing explanation for the source of ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. A vintage model of embodied technology is attractive because it is consistent with the micro-level evidence that …rm-level productivity is highly persistent and that around half of productivity growth happens through reallocation of workers across …rms, not by within …rm productivity growth. Second, I do not need to resort to unreasonable parameterizations or non-standard wage setting rules to get rigidity in wages to account for the volatilities in unemployment and vacancies.
Finally, the relatively low correlation of market tightness with average labor productivity in the data suggests that there are signi…cant sources of ‡uctuations other than shocks to average labor productivity, and cohort-speci…c shocks might be one such source.
I …nd that with the addition of embodied technology shocks, the MP model is able to account for the cyclical ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The estimated volatility of embodied technology shocks is close to the volatility of disembodied technology shocks, but they explain almost all of the ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. A necessary element in order for the model to produce desirable results is the existence of some type of speci…c human or physical capital.
APPENDIX:
A1: Derivation of the surplus equation in the stationary economy Equation (3) simpli…es to:
Equation (6) simpli…es to:
Equation (7) simpli…es to:
For the part below this I use the Nash bargaining wage determination rule speci…ed in Section 2.2.1. Because = , using equations (13) and (15), I get W U = S B : Substituting this and equation (9) into equation (24) I get:
Finally, substituting for E [max fS B (A 0 ; Z 0 ; z 0 ) ; 0g] from the no pro…t condition (17) unemployment equation simpli…es to:
Plugging equations (22), (23) and (25) into the surplus equation (11), surplus is found to be:
Substituting equation (14) into the expectation term and substituting for C E using equation (2), I get equation (18) .
A2: The non-stationary equilibrium equations for the growth economy
This section gives the surplus equation of the growth economy before it is detrended. The derivation of the equilibrium equations from more primitive conditions is very similar to the nogrowth economy.
I look for equilibria where depends on the aggregate state variables (A; Z) : Set depends on (A; Z) : Set depends on (A; Z; ; t) ; where is the period of entry for the match and t is the current period, t. The surplus of the match depends on (A; Z; z; ; t) : The sets (A; Z; ; t) and (A; Z) are found by the conditions:
(A; Z; ; t) = fz : S(A; Z; z; ; t) 0g ; t (A; Z) = fz : S(A; Z; z; t; t) C E 0g
Although set (A; Z) seems to depend on the current period t; t drops out when the variables are detrended.
The surplus is found as: (ii) Use 0 (A; Z) and an initial guess for S 0 (A; Z; z) to iterate over the surplus equation (18) till it converges. (Sets (A; Z) and (A; Z) are also found in this step.) Results for the economy with only aggregate shocks Notes: All variables are in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
Results for the stationary economy with aggregate shocks and embodied technology shocks 
